Abstract-Remote user authentication scheme is one of the most convenient authentication schemes to deal with secret data via insecure communication channel. During the last couple of decades, many researchers have proposed a remote user authentication schemes which are ID-based, password-based, and smart card-based. Above all, smart card-based remote user authentication schemes for multi-server environment are a widely used and researched method. One of the benefits of smart cardbased authentication scheme is that a server does not have to keep a verifier table. Furthermore, remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment has resolved the problem of users to manage the different identities and passwords. In 2015, Baruah et al. improved Mishra et al.'s scheme, and claimed that their scheme is more secure and practical remote user authentication scheme. However, we find that Baruah et al.'s scheme is still insecure. In this paper, we demonstrate that their scheme is vulnerable to outsider attack, smart card stolen attack, user impersonation attack and replay attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Lamport [1] proposed the first password-based authentication scheme via insecure communication in 1981, password-based authentication schemes [2] - [8] have been extensively investigated. However, a problem of password-based authentication scheme is that a server must maintain a password table for verifying the legitimacy of a remote user. Therefore, the server requires additional memory space for storing the password table for verifying user identity. Furthermore, password is generally simple and can be easily broken or forgotten. For this reason, many researchers has proposed a new remote user authentication scheme by using biological characteristics of persons such as fingerprint, iris and so on. The main property of using biometric is its uniqueness. In the view of the fact that many remote user authentication schemes using biological characteristics [9] - [12] have been proposed. In 2010, Li and Hwang [13] proposed a remote user authentication scheme which was based on biometric verification, smart card, one-way hash function and nonce for authentication. However, in 2011, Li et al. [14] found that Li and Hwang's scheme does not provide proper authentication and cannot resist man-in-themiddle attack. After that, Chuang and Chen [15] proposed an anonymous multi-server authentication scheme based on trust computing. However, Mishra et al. [16] demonstrated that the authentication scheme of Chuang and Chen cannot resist stolen * Corresponding Author: Dongho Won smart card attack and impersonation attack and then proposed an improved multi-server based authentication scheme using smart cards for security enhancement. In 2015, Baruah et al. [17] showed that the authentication scheme of Mishra et al. cannot withstand stolen smart card attack and impersonation attacks as well and proposed biometric-based remote user authentication scheme in multi-server environment. However, Baruah et al.'s authentication scheme is still insecure. We find that their scheme cannot withstand outsider attack, smart card stolen attack, impersonation attack and replay attack as well. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing Baruah et al.'s remote user authentication scheme in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe security weaknesses of Baruah et al.'s scheme. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 4.
II. REVIEW IN BARUAH ET AL.'S SCHEME
This section reviews the biometric-based multi-server authentication scheme proposed by Baruah et 
A. Registration phase
The registration phase is the initial phase of the scheme. In this phase, the registration center provides the secrets to the user as well as the server. It consists of the server registration phase and the user registration phase.
Server Registration phase When a server wants to provide some service to the public, then it has to first register itself to the registration center. The server sends a join request along with its identity (say, SID j ) to the registration center. In return, the registration center replies with h(SID j ||h(P SK)) and h(P SK||x) through the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [18] . The server uses these secret to authenticate any registered user.
User Registration phase
The users must first register themselves if they want to access any services provided by the set of registered servers. Therefore, the user submits his/her identity ID i and R 1 = h(P W i ||BIO i ) via a secure channel. Then, the registration center performs the following.
1) The registration center computes,
2) Then, the registration center creates a smart card SC i with the following information
and sends the smart card to user over a secure channel.
B. Login phase
To start any conversation, the user must first login to a specific terminal using smart card. The user inserts his/her the smart card into card-reader and inputs his/her identity ID i , password P W i and biometric information BIO i . Then, the smart card executes the following sequence of operations.
1) The smart card before sending any information to the server first checks whether the user is authorized to gain access or not. Therefore, it computes R 1 = h(P W i ||BIO i ) and then verifies whether the entered identity ID i is equal to stored identity
If failure occurs, the login phase is immediately aborted. Otherwise, proceeds for the succeeding steps. 2) After checking the identity of user, the smart card
from the stored data. 3) Then, the smart card randomly generates a nonce N i and computes the messages.
4) The smart card transmits the login request message {B i , M 1 , M 2 , V 1 } to the server SID j over a public channel for authentication.
C. Authentication phase
After receiving the login request messages, the server SID j performs the following set of operations to agree on the same session key.
1) The server uses its secrets, obtained during registration, to compute
2) Before generating any messages, the server must verify the user's authenticity. So, it uses the above derived information and verifies whether V 1 is equal to the computed value h (N i ⊕ B i ) or not. If this holds, then the server generates a random nonce N j . On failure, the phase is simply exited.
3) The server uses the user's information and its nonce N j and identity SID j to generate the session key as
Now, the server sends its randomly selected nonce to the user as
over a public channel. 5) Once the message is received, the user computes N j from M 3 . It then uses the information to compute the session key as
. It is to be noted that both session keys are the same. 6) Now, the user verifies whether the server is the actual one or not with whom he/she wants to communicate with. It is done by checking N i with the computed value V 2 ⊕ h(SK ij ||N j ).
D. Password change phase
The mechanism is simple enough that if the user wants to change his/her password, it can be done without informing the registration center.
1) The user U i inserts his/her smart card into card-reader and enters his/her identity ID i , password P W i and biometric BIO i . 2) Smart card checks the entered information. If the user is the authentic one, then the smart card prompts the user for new password P W * i and computes,
3) Lastly, the smart card updates E * i and C * i in the place of E i and C i . Now, the updated smart card has
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF BARUAH ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we demonstrate the vulnerability of Baruah et al.'s scheme in various communication scenarios. The following assumptions are made during the analysis and design of the scheme.
1) An adversary can be either a user or a server. A registered user as well as a registered server can act as an adversary. 2) An adversary can eavesdrop every communication in public channels. He/she can capture any message exchanged between user and server.
3) An adversary has the ability to alter, delete or reroute the captured message. 4) Information can be extracted from the smart card by examining the power consumption of the card.
A. Outsider Attack
Any adversary U a who is the legal user and owns a smart card can obtain information {B a , C a , D a , E a , h(·) } and then he/she can compute h(P SK) = D a ⊕ h(ID a ). Thus, an adversary U a can get h(P SK) which same for each legal user and is the hash value of pre-shared key of the servers.
B. Smart Card Stolen & Off-line Identity Guessing Attack
Smart card stolen attack means an adversary who possessed with smart card performs any operation which the smart card and obtains any information. If an outsider adversary U a steals the smart card of legitimate user U i and obtains parameters {B i , C i , D i , E i , h(·)}, then he/she can easily compute out the hash value of the identity of the user U i by computing D i ⊕ h(P SK). Now, an adversary U a performs an off-line identity guessing to get the current identity of the user U i .
1) The adversary calculates h(ID
2) Then, the adversary selects a random identity ID * i , calculates h(ID * i ) and compares it with h(ID i ). If the result is equal to h(ID i ), the adversary infers that ID * i is user U i 's identity. Otherwise the adversary selects another identity nominee and performs the same processes, until he locates the valid identity. 3) After computing the identity of user U i , an adversary can compute
C. User Impersonation Attack
An outsider and smart card stolen adversary U a can get the value h(P SK) from his own card which is same for each user and the values ID i , h(A i ) from legitimate user U i 's smart card. Then, he/she can easily impersonate as user U i to login and access the remote server because he can compute
1) The adversary randomly generates a nonce N i . 2) Then, the adversary calculates,
3) After computing parameters, an adversary transmits the login request message {B i , M 1 , M 2 , V 1 } to the server SID j over a public channel for authentication.
D. Replay Attack
An outsider adversary U a eavesdrop a communication between a user and the server and then may try to use these messages for opening a communication to a server in future. An adversary U a may eavesdrop a communication and store the login messages, {M 1 , M 2 , V 1 , B i }, for performing replay attack in future where (ID i ||N i ) .
IV. CONCLUSION
In 2015, Baruah et al. proposed an enhanced scheme of Mishra et al.'s scheme and demonstrated it is resistance to famous attacks such as impersonation attacks, smart card stolen attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, man-in-themiddle attacks and replay attacks. However, Baruah et al.'s scheme is still insecure. We shown how their scheme can suffer from outsider attacks, smart card stolen attacks, user impersonation attacks and replay attacks. Finally, our further research direction ought to propose a secure user authentication scheme which can solve these problems.
